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CASE NOTES
compensate an insured in the event of serious loss.56 Finally, by requiring a
foreign insurer to appoint an agent for service of process, 57 the state manifests
an interest in providing a local forum for California residents who may have
claims against a foreign insurer.
One defect in the United opinion is that it does not indicate how much
business the defendants had solicited in California but, assuming that the
business was substantial, it is difficult to maintain that California did not act
in pursuance of its legitimate interest when it subjected the defendants to
its regulatory laws. The propriety of California's action is supported by the
following statement by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Travelers
Health:
A state is helpless when the out-of-state company operates be-
yond the borders, establishes no office in the state, and has no agents,
salesmen, or solicitors to obtain business for it within the state.
Then it is beyond the reach of process. In the present case, however,
that is only the formal arrangement. The actual arrangement shows
a method of soliciting business within Virginia as active, continuous,
and methodical as it would be if regular agents or solicitors were em-
ployed."
It is evident that the effect of a foreign insurer upon a regulating state
is not dependant upon the number of agents the insurer employs in the state.
That fact coupled with the state interest, embodied in the California Insur-
ance Code should be sufficient to sanction the power exercised in United.
STEPHEN L. JOHNSON
Estate Taxation—Marital Deduction—Finality of State Decree Deter-
mining Property Interest.—Commissioner v. Boscb. 1—The testator, Her-
man Bosch, executed a trust agreement providing for the payment of trust
income to his wife for her life, and granting her a general power of appoint-
ment over the principal upon her death. Subsequently, the wife, to avoid the
inclusion of the trust corpus as part of her estate subject to federal tax
upon her death, executed a partial release of her power of appointment?
Upon the death of Bosch, his executor claimed the widow's trust as a marital
56 66 Cal. 2d at 593, 427 P.2d at 209, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
57 Cal. Ins. Code § 1600 (West 1955).
58 339 U.S. at 653-54.
1 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
2 Under the terms of the trust agreement created in 1930, and amended in 1931,
Mrs. Bosch was granted a general power of appointment over the trust corpus. On
October 25, 1951, Mrs. Bosch executed a release of her power to appoint the trust
corpus in favor of herself, her estate, her creditors or creditors of her estate. Under the
Internal Revenue Code, the value of the gross estate includes property with respect to
which a general power of appointment is exercised, but the Code also provides that the
exercise of a general power of appointment created before October 21, 1942, and partially
released prior to November 1, 1951, will not be deemed to be the exercise of a general
power of appointment. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041(a) (1).
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deduction—a deduction which can be granted only if a general power of
appointment passes with the property interest from the decedent to the
surviving spouse. 3
 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, believing the
widow's release to be valid, disallowed the deduction. 4 The executor then
filed a petition in the Tax Court alleging the invalidity of the wife's release.
While this action was pending, he also brought a proceeding in the New
York Supreme Court, in part, for a determination of the same issue. The
New York trial court found that the release was a nullity and the Tax Court
subsequently accepted this finding. 5
 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court, 6
 and declared that the question
as to the release had been authoritatively settled by the New York court!
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court joined Bosch with a com-
panion case, Second Nat'l Bank v. United States. 8
 This case was concerned
with the effect to be given a state probate court decree in an estate tax case.
It was decided by the Second Circuit, through a different panel than that
which had presided over Bosch. In Second Nat'l Bank, however, the court
held that a state probate court decree "under no circumstances can be con-
strued as binding and conclusive upon a federal court in construing and apply-
ing the federal revenue laws."
In reversing and remanding Boschl° and affirming Second Nat'l Bank,
the Supreme Court, HELD: " [W] here the federal estate tax liability turns
upon the character of a property interest held and transferred by the decedent
under state law, federal authorities are not bound by the determination made
of such property interest by a state trial court." 11 Justices Harlan, Fortas
and Douglas dissented and would give state trial court determinations binding
effect under certain circumstances.
This decision marks the first time that the Supreme Court has held,
absent collusion or a nonadversary proceeding, that a state trial court de-
cision affecting property rights cannot bind the federal court when these
property rights are subject to controversy in a proceeding involving a federal
tax question. In the past, state trial court decrees settling property rights
have been ascribed binding effect in federal proceedings provided the state
action had not been collusive. 12 The test used to determine the existence of
collusion has generally revolved around the adversary character of the pro-
3 Id. § 2056(b) (5).
4 A valid release of the widow's power of appointment would preclude appointment
in favor of herself or her estate and, therefore, her interest would not qualify for the
marital deduction under the Code. Id.
5 Bosch v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 120 (1964).
6 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966).
7 Id. at 1014.
8 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965).
° Id. at 494.
10 Upon remand, the Second Circuit upheld the widow's partial release con-
cluding that the New York Court of Appeals would not follow the decision of the
New York Supreme Court. 382 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1967).
387 U.S. at 457.
12 See Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 908 (1965); Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
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ceeding. The three dissenters in Bosch essentially supported the approach
previously taken by the federal courts, but differed on what prerequisites
should be met by the state proceeding.
In reaching its decision, the Court first cited its opinion in Freuler v.
Helvering13 which held, in part, that where the United States was not a party
to the state action the resulting decree did not have the effect of res judicata
in the federal action. 14 Next, the Court maintained that the rigid limitations
within which the marital deduction can be allowed reflect congressional intent
that the statute be strictly construed and applied. The Court found support
for this conclusion in a Senate Finance Committee report submitted prior to
the enactment of the marital deduction allowance. 15 This report advised that
"proper regard" be given to a state court interpretation of a will in a bona
fide adversary proceeding. The Court found no suggestion that finality be
given to such a decree and thought this was consistent with the Rules of
Decision Act" and the principles inherent in the Erie doctrine. 17 The Rules
of Decision Act provides that in the absence of federal legislation, the laws
of the states shall be regarded as the rules of decision in civil actions in
federal courts. With this in mind, the Court referred to Erie and concluded
that federal courts must adhere only to the decisions of a state's highest court.
If a state's highest court has not spoken on the same facts and issue of law
before the federal court, the latter should apply what it finds to be the state
law and give only "proper regard" to a state trial court determination of the
issue in controversy. The underlying conclusion of the Court appears to be
that the federal interest is paramount in the collection of federal revenue and
to consider a state trial court decree binding would jeopardize the enforcement
of the strict prescriptions of the marital deduction legislation. Accordingly,
the Bosch holding requires that the federal courts make their own determina-
tion of property interests through an independent examination of the appli-
cable state law." The Court concluded that its holding "would avoid much of
the uncertainty that would result from the 'non-adversary' approach . . ."
and yet be fair to the taxpayer while protecting the federal revenue. 19 The
Court failed to clarify the uncertainty to which it referred. Its reliance on
Erie, however, would suggest that it is more than the mere uncertainty result-
ing from the varying tests used to determine the existence of collusion, but
13 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
14 Id. at 43.
18 S. Rep. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1948).
in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
17 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18 The application of the Bosch rule is illustrated by•a recent district court decision,
Underwood v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 389 (D.C. Tenn. 1967). In that case, the
testator had provided that the executor's fee should not exceed 5% of the gross amount
of the estate. The probate court had allowed 8% after the executor refused to serve
for less. Applying the Bosch rule, the federal court disallowed a deduction of the addi-
tional 3% as an administrative expense, having construed the local law as dictating that
the direction of the testator controls. The federal statute allowed deductions for ad-
ministrative expenses if allowed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the estate was
administered. The federal court felt required by Bosch to determine independently the
law of the state. Id. at 395.
13 387 U.S. at 465.
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in addition, uncertainty as to the accuracy of a state trial court's interpreta-
tion and application of its own state law.
In order to assess the Court's decision and, in particular its rejection of
the nonadversary approach, a brief summary of prior federal law in this area
is helpful. The tendency of the federal courts to adopt a test based on the
collusiveness of a proceeding, in order to determine whether a state decision
should be given effect, evolved from the Supreme Court's decisions in Freuler
and Blair v. Commissioner. 2° In Freuler the Court rejected a contention that
the state proceeding was "collusive in the sense that all the parties joined in
a submission of the issues and sought a decision which would adversely affect
the Government's right to additional income tax." 24 In that case, a trustee
had distributed trust income to the beneficiaries which should have been
retained to cover trust depreciation. He had deducted the amount representing
trust depreciation from his trustee's return but, following the Commissioner's
ruling that the beneficiaries had to report these amounts as income, he filed
an accounting in the state trial court. The Supreme Court held as binding the
resulting state decree which required the beneficiaries to repay to the trustee
the amounts in question. It was emphasized that the decision of the state
court both established the law of the state respecting the distribution of the
trust estate and adjudicated the property rights of the beneficiaries. 22 Impor-
tant to the Court's holding, however, was its conclusion that the state decree
was within the meaning of the "order governing the distribution" referred to
in the federal statute upon which tax liability turned. 23 It is meaningful to
note that the Court in Bosch did not refer to its decision in Freuler other
than to cite it as support for the res judicata proposition.
In Blair, summarily dismissed by the Court in Bosch because it involved
a state appellate court decision, 24 the Supreme Court again held a state deci-
sion binding. Here, the state court had upheld the petitioner's power to assign
trust income to his children. The Commissioner contended, however, that the
trust was unassignable and that the petitioner was liable for taxes on the en-
tire trust income. Citing Freuler, the Court rejected the contention that the
trustee's action to obtain a construction of the will was collusive and de-
clared that the state decision had settled the property rights. 25
In Freuler and Blair, the Supreme Court's consideration of the state
proceedings in order to determine whether they had been collusive was cursory
and, therefore, failed to set forth adequate guidelines for the federal courts
to follow. Nevertheless, the lower federal courts apparently determined that
Freuler and Blair provide a general rule to be followed, namely, that absent
collusion the courts must accept state decrees affecting property rights as
binding. In Gallagher v. Smith,26 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
relying on Freuler, concluded that where property rights have been settled in
20 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
21 291 U.S. at 45.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 44-45.
24 387 U.S. at 462 n.3.
25 300 U.S. at 10.
26 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
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a noncollusive state proceeding they could not be changed by an independent
examination of state law.27 Though the state proceeding had not been adver-
sary, the circuit court, satisfied that the questions respecting property rights
had been fairly presented to the state trial court and been given its indepen-
dent consideration, found it to be noncollusive. 28
In two other court of appeals cases involving estate tax controversies, the
state trial court decrees determining property interests which would decide
the validity of claimed marital deductions were found to be collusive and,
therefore, not binding. In Pierpont v. Commissioner,29 the fact that the pro-
ceeding had been nonadversary, that the examiner-master had failed to make
an independent inquiry into state law, and that the court had no more than
"rubber stamped" the examiner's report led to this finding." The court,
however, citing Freuler, stated that a decision determining property rights
must be followed if it is not collusive.31 In Faulkerson's Estate v. United
States,32 the Seventh Circuit found that an ex parte state proceeding which
had been brought solely to affect the Government's right to additional tax
was collusive. 33 The federal court, however, did not preclude the binding
effect of a state court decree
where the state court proceeding was adversary and not ex parte;
where a hearing was had on the merits; where the question of law
has been settled by the appellate courts of the state or where the
judgment of an intermediate court may be fairly accepted as evi-
dencing the law of the state; and where the judgment is not collu-
sive ... .34
The court in Gallagher emphasized that property rights settled by a state
court even in a nonadversary proceeding, if binding upon the parties, should
be binding in the federal tax case. The court in Pierpont read Freuler differ-
ently and would require the proceeding to be adversary. In the Faulkerson
case an approach was adopted that is somewhat akin to that used in Bosch,
i.e., requiring that the property rights established in the local court rest upon
well established state law. While these cases range between wide extremes,
each has established some basis upon which the state court decree will be
accepted as final on the question of property rights before the federal courts.
The presence or absence of collusiveness is determinative in each It is inter-
esting to note that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Pierpont and
Faulkerson which may indicate that the Court has previously acquiesced
in the use of a "collusion" test by the federal courts."
The three dissenting members of the Court in Bosch concurred in varying
degrees with the tests used by the federal courts. Justice Douglas, who was
27 Id. at 225.
28 Id. at 226.
29 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965).
• 30 Id. at 281.
37 Id.
32 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962).
33 Id. at 232.
34 Id. at 233.
85 See notes 29 & 32 supra.
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concerned with the potential unfairness to the taxpayer, maintained that,
absent collusion, where a state court has reached a deliberate decision con-
struing state law, even though the proceeding was nonadversary, the federal
court must give the decision binding effect as being declaratory of the state
law.3° Justice Harlan, on the other hand, felt that adverse financial interests
should be represented in the state action. 37 Justice Fortas concurred with
Justice Harlan, but added a separate comment. He would consider: the
jurisdiction of the court and the binding effect of the decree upon the parties;
the precedential value of the court's decisions; the deliberateness of the court's
conclusion; the opportunity of the Internal Revenue Commissioner to partici-
pate; the potentially off-setting tax consequences; and, more generally,
whether the state decision had authoritatively determined future property
rights rather than merely labeled past events. The order in which these factors
would be considered and the weight to be given them was not indicated. 38
Underlying both Justices' dissents was a deep concern that the majority's
decision would be "widely destructive both of the proper relationship
between state and federal law and of the uniformity of the administration
of law within a State."39 This concern reflected the dissenters' belief that the
Bosch holding would lead to frequent disregard of considered state trial court
decisions resulting from adversary proceedings when the identical questions
of fact and law are before a federal court. The Court's rejection of the non-
adversary approach suggests that the majority viewed the problem as requiring
more than the mere formulation of an adequate test to determine whether a
state proceeding was collusive. The Court could have found collusion in Bosch
and Second Nat'l Bank as indicated by its statement that " Mt can hardly be
denied that both state proceedings were brought for the purpose of directly
affecting federal estate tax liability."49
In addition to relying on its belief that the marital deduction statute
should be strictly construed, the Court seems to have placed substantial
weight on its interpretation of the Senate Finance Committee report. This
report states: "If the surviving spouse takes under the decedent's will, the
interest passing to her is determined from the will. In this connection proper
regard should be given to interpretations of the will rendered by a court in a
bona fide adversary proceeding."41 The report, however, does not indicate what
limitations, if any, are to be placed upon "proper regard." The Committee's
recommendation that "proper regard" be given to the interpretation of a will
in an adversary proceeding could be interpreted as advising that a state pro-
36 See 387 U.S. at 466-71 (dissenting opinion).
37 Id. at 481 (dissenting opinion). In a recent article it was stated that Freuler
"suggests that economic or financial adverseness, and not mere legal adverseness, is
required before a decree will be given binding effect." Fried, External Pressures on
Internal Revenue: The Effect of State Court Adjudications in Tax Litigation, 42
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 647, 659 (1967). The author suggested that Harlan, "[ajlthough he
did not define the term 'collusion,' ... did set forth the requirement for collusiveness, •
i.e., economic adverseness." Id. at 670.
38 387 U.S. at 483-84 (dissenting opinion).
39 Id. at 480 (dissenting opinion).
40 Id. at 463.
41 S. Rep. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1948).
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ceeding should be given conclusive effect, provided it was adversary and not
collusive. The Commissioner in Bosch relied upon such an interpretation of
the report to support his argument that a nonadversary test should be
adopted." As he noted, the Treasury Regulations prescribe that a surviving
spouse's right will be recognized where settled "pursuant to a decision of a
local court upon the merits in an adversary proceeding following a genuine
and active contest." Furthermore, the Commissioner saw no suggestion in the
Regulations that a decision, correct or incorrect, should be overcome as long
as it was genuinely adversary." The widely divergent interpretations of the
Senate report would indicate that this report is inconclusive. It is suggested
that the Court was aware of this inconclusiveness and would claim the strict
limitations imposed by the language of the marital deduction statute to be
the real basis for its holding.
The Court's reasoning that the Erie doctrine supports its conclusion that
binding effect should not be given to a state trial court decree is also open to
criticism. While the majority reasoned that the Bosch decision was consistent
with the well established Erie doctrine, Justices Harlan and Fortas pointed
out that the cases from which the latter decision was derived did not involve
situations where the federal court was confronted by the same legal and
factual circumstances upon which a state court had passed. 45 In addition,
fundamental to Erie was the elimination of discrimination resulting from
having a different rule applied in the federal courts than in the state courts.
The Supreme Court sought in Erie to achieve uniformity in the administration
of the law within the state and even pointed, in that decision, to the lack of
regard for state determinations construing deeds and devises of real estate."
Justices Harlan and Fortas predicted that Bosch would be destructive of this
uniformity because of the incongruity stemming from differing federal and
state court determinations of state law with respect to the same controversy
and, for this reason, they were unwilling to agree that the principles inherent
in the Erie doctrine led to the conclusion reached by the majority.
Underlying the reluctance of Justices Harlan and Fortas to accept the
majority's position appears to be a more narrow conception of the interests of
the federal treasury which they felt would be satisfied by a considered judg-
ment in a state court. For this reason they would look for more positive direc-
tion, both from the legislative history of the statute and the Erie doctrine,
42.Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
43 Treas. Reg. 20.2056(e)-2(d)(2) (1966).
44 Brief for Petitioner at 17 n.15, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
45 387 U.S. at 477 (dissenting opinion). Justice Douglas also criticized the ma-
jority's interpretation of the policy dictated by the Erie line of cases. He contended that
the federal courts are obligated to follow the decision of a lower state court in the
absence of a decision of the state's highest court showing that the state law is other than
announced by the lower court. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940),
which Douglas cited to support this conclusion, involved an intermediate appellate court
decision, however. The Court in West did add that a federal court would not be bound
if it were convinced that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. The
Court, in a decision following West, rejected a trial court decision as having no preceden-
tial value. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153
(1948).
40 304 U.S. at 76.
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before they would accept the rule adopted by the majority. It is apparent
that the majority failed to answer the critical question posed by Justices
Harlan and Fortas, namely, the potentially destructive effect of conflicting
state and federal court determinations. It is unfortunate that the Court in
attempting to protect against the so-called uncertainty of the nonadversary
test, failed to dismiss doubt as to the uncertainty which could result to the
taxpayer through future federal court adherence to the Bosch decision. Any
doubt might have been dismissed had the Court more clearly defined the
implications of its decision. It is submitted that the needed clarity could have
been provided had the Court dealt at greater length with the Freuler and Blair
cases.
The Freuler and Blair cases had substantial influence on federal court
decisions and an underlying concern with promoting uniformity in the admin-
istration of state law. Although Freuler involved a federal statute which the
Court construed as calling for property distribution in accordance with the
determination of a state court, and was distinguishable on that basis, the
failure of the Court to explain its decision that the determination of the state
court established the law of the state and adjudicated the property rights
involved, was extremely unfortunate. The Court's summary dismissal of the
Blair case was likewise unfortunate. While the Court noted a distinction in
that Blair dealt with an appellate court decree, that case did, nevertheless, rely
on Freuler and stood for the fundamental proposition expressed in both
opinions, i.e., that the state court had adjudicated property rights which were
binding on the parties. In Blair, the fact that an appellate court decision was
involved seemed merely to support the Court's finding that the state deter-
mination was not collusive. Nowhere in that pre-Erie decision did the Court
suggest that a state trial court decree should be any less binding than a state
appellate court decree.
The failure of the majority to deal meaningfully with Freuler and Blair,
in combination with other aspects of their opinion, leaves the scope of appli-
cation of the Bosch decision unclear. For example, it can reasonably be argued
that the holding was meant to have limited application and was not intended
to cover federal tax controversies such as those found in Freuler and Blair
where federal income taxes were at issue. The fact that the Court did not
deal with Freuler and Blair, that the holding was expressly limited to estate
tax controversies, and that the Court supported its conclusion through the
strict construction of a specific piece of estate tax legislation, could suggest
that the Court intended Bosch to apply only to federal estate tax controversies
involving the marital deduction. At the same time, the fact that the holding
refers to estate tax controversies without further limitation, and the fact that
the body of the Court's opinion is phrased in very general and comprehensive
terms, can reasonably lead to the conclusion that Bosch is intended to serve
as precedent for any estate tax controversy. Should either of these two pos-
sible conclusions be correct, Freuler and Blair would remain viable precedent,
but only in the area of federal income tax proceedings.
Most significant with respect to the possible implications of the Bosch
decision, is the fact that it may well represent a major shift in the Court's
attitude as to how much weight should be given to state trial court determina-
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tions in matters involving federal taxes generally. Freuler and Blair may no
longer be viable precedent insofar as they give binding recognition to the
determination of property rights by state courts. The fact that the Bosch
holding is expressly limited to estate tax controversies does not rule out this
result because the Court could not reasonably have extended this holding
beyond the area of federal taxation with which it was immediately concerned.
It is not difficult to imagine that the Court, when faced with a case involving
a federal income tax controversy, will point to the principles expressed in
Bosch. It could well find that strict construction of the tax statute involved
was necessary and could again refer to the finding that the Erie doctrine
requires a federal court to look to state law as propounded by the state's
highest court. The fact that both the Blair and Freuler decisions preceded the
establishment of the Erie doctrine is significant in this regard.
It is submitted that when the implications and scope of the Bosch deci-
sion become clear, the Freuler and Blair cases will no longer be viable in any
significant respect. The Court's clear rejection of the nonadversary or collu-
sion test as evidenced by its express language and by its failure even to con-
sider the guidance provided by the Treasury Regulations casts doubt upon the
future validity of this test in any area of federal taxation. The elimination of
this test would appear to leave no other reasonable ground on which to base a
determination that a state trial court decision should or should not be given
binding effect. The only alternatives, then, are to give state trial court
decisions binding effect under all circumstances in all federal non-estate tax
controversies, or, likewise, to preclude the binding effect of state trial court
decisions under all circumstances. The Bosch decision would seem to demand
the latter alternative.
JOHN V. WOODARD
Fair Labor Standards Act-1966 Amendments—Interstate Commerce—
State Sovereignty.—Maryland v. Wirtz. 1—In 1966, Congress amended the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 2 The amendments extended the Act's
minimum wage and overtime provisions to employees of certain enterprises,
whether public or private, engaged in the operation of schools, hospitals, and
related institutions, and employees of electric railway, trolley and motorbus
systems. 3 States and their political subdivisions, insofar as they are employers
1 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 88 S. Ct. 772 (1968).2 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-04, 206, 207, 213, 214,
216, 218 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
3 It should be noted that not all employees engaged in these activities are covered
because § 13 of the Act exempts persons employed in a bona fide executive capacity
(including any employee employed in the capacity of academic, administrative per-
sonnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools). 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1964), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (Supp. II, 1965-66). Also, the 1966 Amendments provide for
an escalation of the minimum wage and overtime provisions over a five-year period for
first-covered employees, i.e., they will receive $1.00 per hour for the first year with
increases of 15 cents per hour each year until the wage reaches $1.60 per hour. Id.
§ 206. Overtime pay will be required for time worked over 44 hours per week the first
year, over 42 hours per week the second, and for over 40 hours per week thereafter. Id.
§ 207. •
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